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Abstract
The paper investigates the effect of interest policy on price bubbles,
trading behavior and portfolio choice in experimental stock markets. A
series of experiments has 8 participants trade an asset over 15 periods.
Alternatively, the participants can invest money in interest-bearing bonds.
Treatment groups are subjected to an endogenous interest policy, while
control groups experience a constant interest rate. Our stock markets are
characterized by bubbles. While we observe a small positive impact of
our interest policy on bubbles, the policy also strongly increases market
volatility. On the other hand, concerning portfolio choice, we find evidence
for value-driven (rational) investment behavior.
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1 Introduction, literature review, and new ques-
tions
For much of the last quarter of the 20th century, it has not been en vogue to
be an intervening macroeconomist - both the monetarist revolution and the eﬃ-
cient market hypothesis (combined with rational expectations) appear to advice
against interventions of central banks. Gradually, this has been put into ques-
tion, most notably after the discovery of ’excess volatility’ (an extent of volatility
on real stock markets that cannot be explained by standard economic models
(Shiller (1981))). Subsequently, economic theory began to consider alternative
approaches to understanding financial markets, such as behavorial models. Re-
cent macroeconomic experience (e.g., the Asian market crisis in 1997) as well
as new theoretical approaches to the analysis of financial markets accelerated a
change in attitude, and renegade macroeconomists have gone even further and
begun to talk of ”the return of depression economics” (Krugman (1999)).
Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), highly visible
and influential in central bank policy, has long been a moderating voice - his
opinion that markets overreacted and showed signs of ”irrational exuberance”
became almost proverbial. Although originally at times ridiculed, this point of
view has found validation over the course of the year 2000. Using an active
interest rate policy, the Fed tried to engineer a ’soft landing’ of the economy,
in particular of stock markets - a macroeconomic experiment on a grand scale.
One of our motivations was to try to extract the essence of such a real world
experiment and test it in a laboratory setting. At the very least, this is less
costly and less risky, and might still give some feedback on how several important
policy variables interrelate.
Our experiment naturally extends a tradition of laboratory stock market ex-
periments. A typical laboratory stock market has the following structure. Six to
eight traders interact with each other using some electronic trading system over
12 or 15 periods. Trade takes usually place using a continuous double auction,
the traded asset is a stock that pays a dividend at the end of each period, and
the dividend is mildly stochastic and stationary over time. In such a market, the
fundamental value of the asset equals the product of the number of remaining
periods times the expected value of the dividend draw. Traders begin the exper-
iment with an endowment in stock and some experimental currency that will be
exchanged at the end of all trading into dollars at a pre-specified rate. All this is
common information. Although it is known that common information does not
necessarily imply common knowledge because priors possibly diﬀer, economic
theory would still typically predict trading at or near the fundamental value of
the stock - or no trade at all, because on a group level this is a zero sum game.
Despite all this, laboratory trading deviates in a ’bubble’ pattern from fun-
damental value. The following stylized facts characterize a typical experimental
stock market bubble (compare figure 3). Trade in early periods tends to be
close to fundamental value, not infrequently even under it. People then bid the
stock price up and eventually trade at prices that are significantly higher than
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the fundamental value - until a certain point in time (here about period 10 or
11) after which the stock price begins to crumble, sometimes in outright crashes
(fast decline in price at high trading volume).
Naturally, economists are puzzled: ’rational’ people would not do this (e.g.
Tirole (1982)). A possible explanation is the ’greater fool theory’ (or Keynes’
’beauty contest’) - even if you are aware of the inherent value of an object, you
are rationally willing to pay more as long as you believe that you will find another
trader to buy the asset from you at an even higher and even less ’rational’ price,
be that because she is a rookie or because she speculates even more aggressively.
Until a short while ago, this was the hope that drove regular people, often
rookies, to quitting their jobs in order to pursue full-time momentum trading
(day trading).
This explanation has already been proposed by the authors of the seminal
paper in the literature (Smith, Suchanek, Williams (1988)). It is all the more
surprising that Lei, Noussair, Plott (2001) have debunked very convincingly the
speculation motive as a sole source of laboratory stock market bubbles. Briefly,
they created a stock market structure that prevented speculation, and observed
very little eﬀect on any bubble measure.
Other papers have investigated the stability of the observed phenomenon
with regard to diﬀerent treatment parameters. King, Smith, Williams, van
Boening (1993) show that neither of the following have an impact on the occu-
rance or size of bubbles: the possibility to short sell stock, to buy on margin,
identical endowments, transaction costs (’brokerage-fees’), professional traders
as experimental subjects, nor price caps and floors. The only possibility they
identify to reduce bubbles is to familiarize some participants with the results
of the Smith, Suchanek, Williams (1988) paper first. Schwartz and Ang (1989)
check the ’house money’ hypothesis - they let people trade with their own money
-, to little avail.
Smith, Suchanek, Williams (1988) also hypothesized that the described trad-
ing pattern might be due to risk-aversion in early periods (trades under funda-
mental value) that leads to price increases in subsequent periods which in turn
create momentum; but Porter, Smith (1995) rule out risk-aversion as a major
factor. Bubbles are also stable with respect to diﬀerences in market organization
(van Boening, Williams, LaMaster (1993)).
Only futures markets (Porter, Smith (1995)) and the experience of subjects
have been found to moderate bubbles. The latter result has been celebrated as
a partial if not complete reconciliation of stock market bubble experiments with
the predictions of economic theory. We have our doubts. The use of experienced
subjects amounts to re-endowing rookies who got stripped of all cash on a first
try, and to bringing them back to trade again with the same players that they
know just ruined them. Successful traders who continue to participate in real
stock markets for a long time though are professional trading houses (and some
lucky individuals), and fresh rookies show up regularly.1
1Anecdotically, Robert Wilson pointed out that practitioners estimate that the average
trading rookie has perished after about six months.
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Be that as it may, experimental stock market bubbles arise, and are stable
with respect to virtually all market parameters. Thus the question: what to
do about them? In the ’real world’, the best known response is to raise key
interest rates, usually by 25 base points at a time, sometimes by 50. This
creates higher opportunity costs of holding stock, and is meant to directly dis-
encourage investments as well.
This paper focuses on the first idea: interest policy and opportunity costs.
We introduce a portfolio alternative to trading in stocks: an interest-bearing
bond. Based on an endogenous interest rate policy algorithm, we raise the
interest rate in treatment groups when we observe bubbles. Control groups
- unknown to them - face a fixed interest rate. We are interested in several
questions. One, is it possible to influence bubbles - to reduce them based on
one or some of a variety of bubble measures we propose? Two, does the portfolio
choice of participants exhibit elements of rational choice, or present new puzzles?
Given that no-one has examined this market structure before, we also want to
thoroughly examine how our results compare to earlier experiments. We find
some support for questions number one and two. Most notably though we
observe a clear increase in market volatility because of our interest policy. We
also find evidence against the active participation hypothesis ( a criticism that
has been occasionally raised against laboratory economics in general), i.e. the
claim that bubbles arise because our participants are bored and all they can do
is trade for the duration of our experiments.
Section 2 describes the experiment in more detail. Section 3 analyzes the
data. We first define some bubble measures, then formulate five conjectures
that we are going to check with our analysis. After a brief overview over our
results, we quantify our bubble measures and other treatment variables. In
order to get an idea of the percentage of fundamental (rational) trading in
our experiment, we introduce a noise trading model and estimate the implied
proportion of rational traders by markets. An analysis of our conjectures follows,
and some conclusions are in section 4. The appendix contains further data, the
experimental instructions, and the interest rate policy algorithm.
2 Experimental design and procedures
2.1 Basic design
Our experiment deals with portfolio choice of individual investors. Participants
receive an initial endowment of stocks and of a fictitious experimental currency
(called ”Gulden”). The stock is characterized as follows:
• A finite life of 15 periods.
• A stationary random dividend payment at the end of each period of either
0, 8, 28, or 60 Gulden (for an average of 24). All payoﬀs are equally likely.
• No redemption value at the end of the experiment, i.e. after period 15.
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Realized trading gains and dividend income is immediately added to the
participants’ working capital and can be used, in subsequent periods, for further
trade in stocks.2
Alternatively, participants can invest cash in interest-bearing bonds. The
interest rate is i = 0.05 in the first period, but variable in principle. The
interest i is paid at the end of the period. Our subjects take a portfolio decision
each period. They cannot access money invested in bonds (to trade in stocks)
for the rest of the respective period. The experiment thus consists of three
phases:
1. Participants decide how to split their total cash for the current period.
Money put into bonds bears interest, but cannot be used to trade. Money
in trade accounts does not bear interest, but can be used to trade stocks
in phase 2 of this period.
2. Trade in stocks takes place. Trade is organized as a continuous double
auction and lasts for 150 seconds each period.
3. The dividend for this period is determined. Income from dividends on
shares of stock and interest on bonds is added to the participants’ total
cash account, together with the current amounts in their trade and bond
accounts. At the beginning of the following period, participants have
money only in their total cash accounts, and a number of shares in their
stock accounts.
In figure 1, we show the net present value (NPV) of the stock at an initial
interest rate of i = 0.05. For period t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 15}, the NPV is defined as
NPV(t) =
15X
j=t
E [dividendt]
(1 + i)j−t
,
using the obvious notation. Valuation of an asset using the NPV concept is
standard practice and amounts to assuming risk-neutrality.3 The upper bound
value (UBV) is the following: assume the highest possible dividend payment
is drawn in each period and calculate the NPV of a stock with this certain
dividend.
Previous experiments (such as Lei, Noussair, Plott (1999), Porter, Smith
(1995), Smith, Suchanek, Williams (1988), or Smith, van Boening, Wellford
(2000)) informed the participants in each period about the current NPV of
one share of stock, to make sure that bubbles did not merely happen because
of individual calculation errors. Because in their setting no interest-bearing
2We conducted a number of control experiments in which interest income was paid out at
the end of the experiment, but was not available to participants before. While this design
conforms less to reality, it allows to precisely distinguish between the income and substitution
eﬀect of the interest policy; but as it turned out, bubble sizes were very comparable.
3Assuming risk-aversion would only increase bubble sizes.
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Figure 1: Net present value (NPV) of a stock (at 5 percent interest)
alternative exists, the NPV is simply the sum of expected dividends. Given that
our experiment is more complicated (even with no change in interest rates), we
cannot expect everyone to immediately understand the concept of a discounted
NPV. And to explain to our participants how a change in interest rates influences
the NPV would almost certainly have confused some of them.
For this reason, and because our focus was not on bubbles per se but on the
impact of interest policy on bubbles, we decided to omit the periodic reports
of NPVs to the participants. Instead, through careful instructions and a set of
test questions, we made sure that the participants understood well the dividend
draw in each period - its impact on ”expected” values, and best and worst
possible cases. Although several of the participating students had previously
attended classes in introductory statistics, we did not rely on any mathematical
or statistical language. We provided calculators for those that wanted them.
While the instructions pointed out that the interest rate might change, we did
not indicate if, when or by which amount a change would happen. Note also
that students could neither trade on margin, nor short sell assets.
A translation of the experimental instructions is in the appendix. The ap-
pendix also has screen shots of the experiment.
2.2 The experimental policy
Our interest rate policy algorithm aims to approximate the behavior of central
banks such as the Federal Reserve Board (Fed). The basic idea is to raise rates
when we see a positive bubble, and to lower them in the opposite situation
(where ’bubble’ is defined as persistant trade at values significantly (more than
50 percent) diﬀerent from the NPV of our stock).
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We do not change the interest rate more frequently than every 4 periods,
and not before period 4, for three reasons: one, to not introduce extra noise
through continual adjustments; two, to keep participants from guessing when
the next change would happen; and three, to approximate another ’real’ Fed
policy - frequent changes are unusual because the market might perceive them
as informative (usually negative) signals in themselves.4
After interventions in one direction, central banks will attempt to create
some leeway for further interventions during times that are less problematic -
e.g., by lowering interest rates to an intermediate level when markets cool oﬀ
after raising them first. Because, for statistical reasons, we restricted ourselves
to only five diﬀerent interest rates (0.01, 0.05, 0.11, 0.15, 0.21), we actually faced
the same problem. Therefore, after interventions in one direction, we intervened
instantly into the opposite direction when mean contract prices hit the stock’s
NPV (which happened only once).
We only used an endogenous algorithm for experiments with inexperienced
subjects. In order to make statistical comparisons meaningful, we subjected
groups of experienced traders to the same interest rates they had witnessed
before.
The appendix contains the code of the interest rate algorithm.
2.3 Procedures
2.3.1 Procedures common to all experiments
Everyone initially received the same endowment in cash and stocks, but we did
not tell the participants. There is suﬃcient evidence (see e.g. King, Smith,
Williams, van Boening (1993), Porter, Smith (1995) or Caginalp, Porter, Smith
(1998)) that initial heterogeneity of cash or stock accounts does not significantly
influence the results of bubble experiments. Because the same is not true for
total (consolidated) endowments, we controlled for the latter by providing the
same initial endowments in all experiments (10 shares of stock and 3,600 Gulden
per participant5).
All subjects were undergraduates from the University of Zurich and the
Eidgenoessische Technische Hochschule/Zurich (ETH). The IEW maintains a
large database of about 3,000 - 4,000 students who they recruit at the begin-
ning of the academic year to participate in ”economic experiments in decision
making.” Experimental subjects are called upon for participation when needed,
their participation and success recorded for future reference, and generally paid
a SFR 10 ($ 6) showup fee in addition to a success dependent bonus at the end
of experiments.
All prior bubble experiments establish the influence of experience on the
trading behaviour of participants. We thus included a number of sessions with
4 In this respect, 2001 is a very unusual year.
5The numbers are from a recent experiment by Lei, Noussair, Plott (2001). More precisely,
they provide either 7,200 Gulden and 0 shares, or 0 Gulden and 20 shares of stock per par-
ticipant. While this was in line with their research focus (bubbles without the possibility of
speculative gains), we had to adjust it to our setting.
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once-experienced traders. We divided each session into two groups of 7 or 8
participants who received the same dividends. One group served as the treat-
ment (policy) group, the other as the control (no policy) group. Experiments
with inexperienced participants lasted on average 2 hours and 30 minutes, those
with experienced participants about 1 hour and 15 minutes. Table 1 gives an
overview over all session.
After the experiment, the participants exchanged their Gulden into Swiss
Franks at a rate known to them from the start. Although we calibrated the ex-
periments so that the average participant received a compensation comparable
(by hour) to a Swiss student salary, we also created incentives for the partici-
pants to trade to the best of their abilities. Final payoﬀs ranged from roughly
SFR 13.00 (including a showup fee of SFR 10.00) to SFR 80.00 (about $ 7 - $
50) - a sizeable success dependent spread.
The trade software was Z-Tree. Z-Tree is a modular C++-based language
originally conceived by Urs Fischbacher (1999) for economic experiments at the
Institut fuer Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung of the University of Zurich6. In
short, experimental participants interact with each other with the help of client
terminals and are supervised by a server (the form of a local area network
(LAN)), a structure that allows for the fast interventions necessary for our
experiments.
2.3.2 Generic experiments
As it turned out, most experiments had the same interest rates. We call them
generic experiments (table 2).
As a shortcut, we used the labels:
1. Generic experiments with inexperienced traders:
• (I,P): Policy
• (I,N): No policy
2. Generic experiments with experienced traders:
• (E,P): Policy
• (E,N: No policy
Figure 2 shows the NPV of a generic (I,P) experiment. We assume static
expectations, i.e. that participants expect the current interest rate to persist
until the end of the experiment. Naturally, this will not be true for every partic-
ipant in every experiment. Still, given the structure of our experimental policy
(which bounds the number of interventions from above by 3), and given that the
experiment is short, we see no reason to believe that participants systematically
deviate from this assumption. We adopt it as a working hypothesis, and make
no further mention of it.
6Z-tree can be downloaded in exchange for a free licence at
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/ztree/howtoget.php.
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Session Policy Experienced Subjects Date conducted
1a Yes No 8 11/29/2000
1b No No 8 11/29/2000
2a Yes No 8 12/06/2000
2b No No 8 12/06/2000
3a Yes No 8 12/14/2000
3b No No 8 12/14/2000
4 Yes Yes 8 12/14/2000
5a Yes No 8 12/15/2000
5b No No 8 12/15/2000
6a Yes No 8 01/25/2001
6b No No 8 01/25/2001
7 No Yes 8 01/25/2001
8a Yes, non-generic No 8 01/26/2001
8b Yes, non-generic No 8 01/26/2001
9a Yes No 8 01/29/2001
9b No No 8 01/29/2001
10 Yes Yes 8 01/29/2001
11a Yes No 7 02/01/2001
11b No No 7 02/01/2001
12 Yes Yes 7 02/01/2001
Sessions a and b were held simultaneously with the same dividend draw for each group
Policies were generic where not indicated diﬀerently
Experiment 1 suﬀered from a software glitch and is not used for statistical tests
Table 1: Basic summary statistics of the experimental sessions
Generic experiments
Period
Treatment 1-3 4-7 8-11 12-15
Policy 0.05 0.11 0.15 0.21
No policy 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Non-generic experiments
Non-generic I
Period 1-4 5-7 8-11 12-15
Interest rate 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.05
Non-generic II
Period 1-5 6-9 8-11 12-15
Interest rate 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.15
Table 2: Generic and non-generic experiments
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Figure 2: NPV of generic (I,P) experiment
2.3.3 Non-generic experiments
Additionally, we conducted two experiments with non-standard policies. We
did not include them into any statistical test, but they may serve for future
research (see table 2).
3 Analysis
We first define diﬀerent measurement variables such as size and duration of
bubbles, intensity of trade, portfolio choice, market volatility and so on. We
then formulate some research hypotheses that we are able to investigate with
the help of our experiment. In order to be able to check our conjectures, we
quantify our measurement variables by treatment. We propose a fairly standard
model of noise trading. A detailed analysis of our research hypotheses concludes
this section.
3.1 Bubble measures and treatment variables
Much of what follows focuses on the following variables:
1. Deviation: Deviation(s) is the standardized distance of observed mean
contract prices from prices that would ensue if risk-neutral traders believ-
ing in dividend-discount models were trading under common knowledge
in a stock with the described dividend structure and lifetime; deviation(n)
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the distance to the expected undiscounted dividend value. Formally,
1
15
15X
t=1
|Pt − ft|
80
deviation(s)
1
15
15X
t=1
|Pt −Divt|
80
deviation(n).
Pt and ft are mean contract price respectively net present value (NPV) of
the stock in period t, and
Divt =
15X
i=t
E[divi], t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 15} .
E[divt] is the expected dividend in t, i.e. in this experiment E[divt] ≡ 24.
We normalize deviation by the number of stocks outstanding (80), which is
constant because we do not retire stock before the end of the experiment.
Intuitively, we thus obtain a measure akin to overvaluation per share. We
also normalize to make the bubble measures comparable in size with each
other.
2. Relative bubble measures the size of the bubble relative to fundamental
value. Its formal definition is as
1
15
15X
t=1
|Pt − ft|
ft
.
3. Duration: Maximum number of consecutive periods during which the
mean contract price increases relative to the net present value (NPV)
of the stock, i.e. formally
max
1≤t≤15
{m : Pt − ft ≤ Pt+1 − ft+1 ≤ ... ≤ Pt+m − ft+m} ,
where Pt and ft are as before.
4. Amplitude: A measure of the overall size of the bubble - the normalized
diﬀerence of the largest and smallest deviation of mean contract prices
from the net present value (NPV) of the stock. We normalize by the net
present value of period 1. Formally, amplitude is defined as
max
1≤t≤15
½
Pt − ft
f1
¾
− min
1≤t≤15
½
Pt − ft
f1
¾
5. Volatility: A measure of the overall volatility of trade prices in all periods.
To make this number meaningful in comparison, we normalize again. We
first calculate the normalized volatility of trade prices for each period, i.e.
Vt =
p
V ariance(trade prices in period t)
Pt
, t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 15} ,
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which is then averaged out over all periods:
1
15
15X
t=1
Vt.
Volatility is an indicator of the market’s overall volatility, not a volatiliy
itself by any standard definition.
6. Turnover : The total volume of trade over all 15 periods divided by the
number of shares outstanding, turnover is an indicator of trade intensity
in the experiment.
3.2 Research Hypotheses
We formulate five conjectures and try to shed some light on them with our
experiments. Some of the conjectures examine hypotheses from prior research
in our setting (in particular Caginalp, Porter, Smith (1998), Smith, van Boening,
Wellford (2000), and Lei, Noussair, Plott (2001)). Others investigate questions
that are specific to our research design. Several have potential implications for
economic policy. We generally use the intuitive abbreviation B(I,P) to indicate
the extent of a bubble in an experiment with inexperienced traders and interest
policy, and similar abbreviations for the other cases; this should be understood
as a semantic variable. At the end of each conjecture, we indicate whether
we were able to uphold or refute it based on our analysis of section 3.5. If
the evidence is ambiguous, we instead conclude that the conjecture is ”mostly
upheld (refuted)”, or ”inconclusive.”
Let’s first check for bubbles:
Conjecture 1 Basic bubble hypothesis (backward induction hypothe-
sis). A common definition has a bubble as sustained price deviation from fun-
damental value. If traders interact which each other under common knowl-
edge of the market structure and backward induct correctly, such bubbles would
not occur (see, e.g., Tirole (1982)). Therefore, consider first the conjecture
that bubbles unanimously do no happen across all treatments, i.e. assume that
B(I,P)=B(I,N)=B(E,P)=0. (refuted)
A higher interest rate impacts value in two ways. Since bonds and stocks
are gross-substitutes, an increase in interest rates should decrease stock prices
and bubble sizes - at least in the case of naive bubbles. On the other hand,
a higher interest rate creates additional income. There is some evidence that
additional income increases the magnitude of a bubble (both Caginalp, Porter,
Smith (1998) and Smith, van Boening, Wellford (2000) conjecture this, but only
the former provide statistically significant support). Because of the presence of
portfolio alternatives in our experiments, it is unclear whether greater wealth
will translate into higher trade liquidity: while relative investment in bonds
should be higher in (I,P) experiments, it is less clear what it means for absolute
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trade liquidity. Overall, however, experiments with interest policy should tend
to reduce bubbles.
Conjecture 2 Policy eﬀect on bubbles and market liquidity. The inter-
est policy raises opportunity costs; although it increases total wealth, it decreases
trade liquidity. Both factors tend to reduce the intensity and likelihood of the
occurance of bubbles, i.e. B(I,P)<B(I,N). (mostly upheld)
A recent paper by Lei, Noussair, Plott (2001) has experimental subjects trade
an asset, and simultaneously in a market for what can be considered a service.
It turns out that such a design reduces errors in decision making compared to
a benchmark of stock trading only (Typical errors in decision making - or more
precisely, non-theory conform trading - would be trades at more than the upper
bound value (UBV)). In Lei et alt’s setting, the value of a stock is completely
uncorrelated to the service market: the only feedback is that time spent in one
market is time less spent in another. In our case, correlation is high: directly, by
how interest rates change the NPV, but also indirectly, through the endogeneity
of the interest rate policy algorithm. It is our conjecture that the earlier results
were partly due to the fact that their experiment had completely segregated
markets.
Conjecture 3 Uncertainty hypothesis. The interest rate policy increases
the uncertainty in the stock market: price volatility grows; trading patterns ex-
plicable by lack of common knowledge of rationality are less likely, while those
pointing to actual irrationality are more likely. (upheld)
What about portfolio choice more general?
Conjecture 4 Value driven investment hypothesis (portfolio choice).
Experimental participants recognize investment opportunities (their portfolio choice
reflects them). Walrasian price adjustment accounts for diﬀerences in profitabil-
ity - if these diﬀerences are unanticipated7. As a result, the presence of invest-
ment opportunities increases the success dependent spread in income. (upheld)
Conjecture 3 relates to what has been called the active participation hypoth-
esis (APH) by Lei, Noussair, Plott (2001). In their own words, the APH says
that a fraction of the volume in the markets is related to the fact that partici-
pation in the asset market is the only activity available for subjects. If market
participation were indeed solely due to the lack of available alternative activi-
ties, markets should not systematically diﬀer with respect to errors in decision
7 Investment professionals know well about the importance of surprises. Before meetings of
the Board of Governors, market pundits provide consensus estimates of the expected decision
of the Fed. If expectations are merely met, a change in interest rates has a modest to no
impact on the stock market. To merely confirm what has been anticipated before may even
be counterproductive. As an example, this is what happened on 03/20/2001 when the Fed
lowered interest rates by 50 base points as had been generally expected. The result was that
markets tumbled - the Dow Jones Industrial Index almost ended the day in bear territory for
the first time in 10 years. The situation was particularly grave because about a third of the
forecasts had predicted a change as dramatic as of 75 base points.
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making. Conjecture 4 points in the same direction: actions and choices are
deliberate and directional. We thus have
Conjecture 5 Irrelevance of the active participation hypothesis. Our
experiment does not support the active participation hypothesis (APH). Other
factors seem to influence the trading behavior more, such as the recognition of
value. (upheld)
3.3 Overview
Figure 3 shows bubbles across diﬀerent treatments, from - as we call them
- a naive, a sophisticated, and a relative perspective (see section 3.1 for defini-
tions). The numbers are averages over all experiments by treatment, but they
are representative for the individual experiments as well (the appendix contains
graphs for all experiments). We normalized the bubble measures so they corre-
spond to overvaluation per share. Figure 3 also charts the mean contract volume
(or turnover) per period per treatment, and the volatility of the turnover.
Note first that any diﬀerences for periods 1 to 3 are likely due to the small
sample nature of our experiments (6 sessions per treatment in the inexperienced
case), because the first policy intervention was after period 3. This said, figure
3 shows that the only clear treatment eﬀect is that of experience. The interest
policy also slightly decreases the size and duration of bubbles in inexperienced
sessions (most notably naive bubbles after period 4). Note also that the size
of relative bubbles tends to increase over time in no policy session, whereas
the interest policy reverses this tendency after an initial increase. Briefly, the
bubble sizes compare as in B(I,N)≥B(I,P)>B(E,P)8. The same is true for
turnover.
Another point has to our knowledge not been noticed before. Both the
graphs of naive and of sophisticated bubbles converge to 0 over time. Ear-
lier authors have generally argued that this reconciles bubble with the rational
expectations hypothesis (because, as they point out, it indicates Bayesian learn-
ing). But recall that we are in a situation in which one variable, ft, converges to
0, as well as another, bubt (representing either of the first two bubble measures).
How much do we learn then from the fact that bubt → 0? This could still mean
that bubtft ↑ +∞ although ft and bubt both go to zero - but at diﬀerent orders of
magnitude. The relative bubble chart shows that, approximately, bubtft → 1.5 in
both inexperienced treatments. The experienced sessions approach a value of
about 1. While we do not believe that the value of 1.5 (or 1) has any particular
significance, we should still keep this in mind when talking about bubbles that
”...converge to zero” (Smith, van Boening, Wellford (2000)).
Figure 4 shows the average trade volume in more detail - turnover is very
comparable in size across treatments in inexperienced sessions -, figure 5 the
volatility of mean contract prices by treatment.
8We exclude the (E,N) treatment to keep the graphs more readable. We are not interested
in (E,N) experiments per se and used them only as a benchmark for the baseline experiments.
They are also included in later statistical tests.
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Figure 3: Bubbles and trade volume in experimental stock markets by treatment
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Treatment
Measure I,P I,N E,P E,N
Duration 3.33 5.83 3 2
Turnover 3.77 3.96 2.55 2.83
Amplitude 1.02 1.08 0.65 0.36
Price variance 0.28 0.18 0.13 0.10
Norm. deviation (naive) 1.14 1.64 0.48 0.15
Norm. deviation (soph.) 1.91 2.02 0.80 0.58
Relative bubble 1.36 1.20 0.50 0.31
Table 3: Bubble measures by treatment
The variance of mean contract prices exhibits a clear treatment eﬀect. In
experiments with interest policy, it is in all but one period an upper envelope
of the volatility in control experiments with no interest policy. Notice the con-
siderable spike in one of the 3 intervention periods (period 8), which in our eyes
reflects the uncertainty introduced to the system through the interest policy.
If we admit price variance as a bubble measure, the volatility chart implies a
ranking of B(I,P)>B(I,N)>B(E,P).
3.4 Quantification of bubbles and simple explanatory mod-
els
3.4.1 Measurement of bubbles
Table 3 shows the values of the bubble measures for all treatments.
We usually conducted parametric and non-parametric tests of our hypotheses
because we often had to deal with small samples. If both tests point to the same
result, we accept it; if one test is significant but not the other, we try to find
further evidence. Table 4 shows the test results. Both two-sample t-tests and
Wilcoxon tests check for diﬀerences in the distribution (location) of two random
vectors. They are essentially equivalent. The Wilcoxon test (also known as
Ranksum, or Mann-Whitney test) is non-parametric and distribution free, and
hence usually fares better if the underlying distribution is non-normal, or the
sample size is small.
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Measure Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value Wilcoxon p-value
Duration H0: I,P < I,N -1.239 (0.122) -0.973 (0.165)
H0: I,P > E,P 0.210 (0.420) 0.523 (0.301)
Amplitude H0: I,P < I,N -0.458 (0.328) <10−4 (1.000)
H0: I,P > E,P 2.243 (0.030) 1.549 (0.061)
Price H0: I,P > I,N 1.748 (0.056) 1.761 (0.039)
variance H0: I,P > E,P 2.052 (0.040) 2,324 (0.010)
Deviation(s) H0: I,P < I,N -0.252 (0.403) -0.480 (0.316)
H0: I,P > E,P 2.810 (0.013) 2.324 (0.010)
Turnover H0: I,P = I,N -0.183 (0.857) -0.480 (0.631)
H0: I,P = E,P 1.133 (0.294) 1.033 (0.302)
Rel. bubble H0: I,P < I,N -0.227 (0.587) 0.480 (0.316)
H0: I,P > E,P 1.924 (0.048) 2.324 (0.020)
Deviation(n) H0: I,P < I,N -1.368 (0.101) -1.601 (0.055)
H0: I,P > E,P 1.778 (0.059) 1.807 (0.035)
Table 4: Test of diﬀerences in bubble measures


dP2
dP3
dP5
dP6
dP9
dP11
dN2
dN3
dN5
dN6
dN9
dN11
dEP4
dEP10
dEP12
dEN7


=


1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
0 1 1




βdP
βdN
βdExp

+


εd1
εd2
εd3
εd4
εd5
εd6
εd7
εd8
εd9
εd10
εd11
εd12
εd13
εd14
εd15
εd16


(1)
⇐⇒: d =Mβd + εd
We also conducted a regression analysis of the bubble measures using seem-
ingly unrelated regression (SUR). In the parametric case, we had six sets of
regression equations. A generic equation is of the form of (1). εd is white
noise, dij is the value of the variable duration in treatment i (P=(I,P), N=(I,N),
EP=(E,P), EN=(E,N)) and experiment j (see table 1). The coeﬃcient βdp
is the baseline (inexperienced) coeﬃcient for generic experiments with interest
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policy. βdN is the baseline (inexperienced) coeﬃcient for generic experiments
with interest rate fixed at 5 %. βdExp measures the impact if the experimental
subjects were once experienced, i.e. had already participated in a prior run of
the same experiment.
The other bubble measures are t (turnover), a (amplitude), v (volatility),
nd (deviation - sophisticated or naive) and rb (relative bubble). Clearly, there
are possible cross-equation correlations, so we stack the diﬀerent equations as
in (2) and perform a SUR estimation.


d
t
a
v
nd
rb


=


M 0 0 0 0 0
0 M 0 0 0 0
0 0 M 0 0 0
0 0 0 M 0 0
0 0 0 0 M 0
0 0 0 0 0 M




βd
βt
βa
βv
βnd
βrb


+


εd
εt
εa
εv
εnd
εrb


,(2)
⇐⇒ : y = Xβ + ε
It has been recommended elsewhere (Conover (1999)) that in experimental
designs for which no non-parametric tests exist one should use the usual analysis
of variance on the data and then perform the same procedure on the rank
transformed data. We thus ranked our experimental data in ascending order
and ran another SUR on the ranked data. The results of both the parametric
estimation and the estimation using rank-transformed data are in table 5.
Table 6 contains the results of some hypothesis tests we performed on the
data from table 5. The statistics shown are t- respectively F-tests; in the case
of the non-parametric regressions, these tests are equivalent to Mann-Whitney
respectively Kruskal Wallis tests (Conover (1999)). Both series of tests generally
point in the same direction (on the 10 % significance level they agree in every
case).
The coeﬃcients of table 3 indicate that in experiments with inexperienced
traders the bubble measures - with the exception of price variance - are smaller
in experiments with interest policy than in baseline no policy experiments. In
other words, except for volatility, interest policy has a positive - if small - impact
on bubbles. We next checked whether the evidence is statistically significant
(table 4). The data only modestly support that bubble measures are smaller in
policy treatments (on a 10 % significance level, this holds only for naive bubbles,
with a more generous decision criterion also for duration). Price variance clearly
increases in policy experiments.
The regressions give a more insightful feedback on these comparisons be-
cause they show cause and eﬀect. The coeﬃcients are generally highly signif-
icant (table 5), except for experienced coeﬃcients for turnover and duration
(the coeﬃcient for turnover is slightly significant). Table 6 contains the results
of statistical tests. The test of equality of the bubble measures (βP = βN)
cannot be rejected, except for volatility again. The impact of experience is
generally positive (βexp ≥ 0), except for duration. All tests strongly reject the
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Parametric estimation
Dependent variable
Coeﬃ- Dura- Ampli- Price Devi- Turn- Rel. Devia-
cient tion tude variance ation(s) over bubble tion(n)
βp 3.68 1.06 0.23 1.23 3.77 1.38 1.95
(p-val.) (0.001) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4)
βN 5.48 1.05 0.14 1.56 3.97 1.26 1.99
(p-val.) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4)
βE -1.38 -0.48 -0.10 -0.92 -1.20 -0.85 -1.22
(p-val.) (0.435) (<10−4) (0.027) (0.004) (0.149) (0.006) (0.001)
R2 0.67 0.96 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.89
F-stat. 32.83 373.29 85.75 83.42 105.49 81.32 125.13
n 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Ranked regressions
Dependent variable
Coeﬃ- Dura- Ampli- Price Devi- Turn- Rel. Devia-
cient tion tude variance ation(s) over bubble tion(n)
βP 8.47 10.7 12.03 9.27 8.48 9.93 10.32
(p-val.) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4)
βN 10.2 10.3 7.63 11.4 10.68 9.4 10.52
(p-val.) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4)
βE -2.9 -8.1 -6.43 -6.8 -3.78 -4.8 -7.62
(p-val.) (0.244) (<10−4) (0.001) (<10−4) (0.116) (0.050) (<10−4)
R2 0.81 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.89
F-stat. 67.90 146.39 115.47 132.12 74.15 71.49 130.38
n 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Note: seemingly unrelated regression of measures 1-6 together. Measure 7 is from a
separate SUR.
Table 5: Analysis of bubble measures
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Parametric regressions
Dependent variable
Dura- Ampli- Price Devi- Turn- Rel. Devi-
Null H. tion tude variance ation(s) over bubble ation(n)
βP = βN 1.35 0.01 4.14 1.35 0.08 0.19 0.01
(0.245) (0.925) (0.042) (0.245) (0.778) (0.661) (0.904)
βP = βN 29.46 339.61 77.60 81.27 91.51 77.61 114.48
= 0 (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4)
βExp ≥ 0 -0.781 -4.115 -2.215 -2.870 -0.144 -2.760 -3.298
(0.218) (<10−4) (0.013) (0.002) (0.074) (0.003) (<10−4)
Ranked regressions
Dependent variable
Dura- Ampli- Price Devi- Turn- Rel. Devi-
Null H. tion tude variance ation over bubble ation(n)
βP = βN 0.64 0.07 6.38 1.69 1.09 0.75 0.01
(0.425) (0.799) (0.012) (0.194) (0.300) (0.386) (0.904)
βP = βN 59.76 143.67 108.35 128.55 67.51 134.03 127.42
= 0 (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4) (<10−4)
βExp ≥ 0 -1.166 -4.511 -3.224 -3.617 -1.570 -4.335 -4.027
(0.122) (<10−4) (0.001) (<10−4) (0.058) (<10−4) (<10−4)
First row are t- resp. F-statistics, the second p-values
Table 6: Hypothesis tests
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more extreme hypothesis that βP = βN = 0. Summing up, and excluding
volatility for the moment, the data are compatible with a relative ranking of
B(E,P)<B(I,P)≤B(I,N), with a possible equality in the second comparison.
Based on volatility, the ranking is unequivocally B(I,P)>B(I,N)>B(E,P).
3.4.2 Measurement of liquidity, trading behavior and success
Liquidity Figure 6 charts consolidated total market liquidity, i.e. the sum
of the total cash accounts of the participants by period; it also shows trade
liquidity. As such, it provides evidence of the income eﬀect (as opposed to the
substitution eﬀect) of interest policy. Remark the clear and cumulative im-
pact of the higher interest rates in policy experiments - total liquidity increases
markedly. On the other hand, experience does not influence total liquidity much.
Figure 7 charts the portfolio choice and absolute trade liquidity by treatment
and compares the investment decision between treatments.
Absolute trade liquidity is higher in no policy treatments than in treatments
with interest policy (conversely, absolute investment in bonds is higher in policy
than in no policy experiments). Similarly, relative investment in bonds in (I,P)
experiments is an upper envelope to relative investment in bonds in (I,N) exper-
iments. Even more clearly, investment in bonds rises absolutely and relatively
in experiments with experienced traders.
Figure 8 shows how this investment behavior varies across participants. In
other words, it charts the heterogeneity of the share of the participants’ portfolio
invested in bonds. In every period, investment in bonds varies less in (I,P)
experiments compared to (I,N) experiments.
Trading behavior We split the positive real line into three areas. Assume
the highest possible dividend payment is drawn in each period and calculate the
NPV of a stock with this certain dividend. As mentioned before, call this the
upper bound value (UBV), and trades at more than UBV high (or ’h’). Trades
at h are special because no attitude towards risk can justify value investment (as
compared to investment for other reasons such as speculation, or computational
errors) in the stock at a price of higher than UBV. Conversely, we call deals
under the expected NPV of the stock low (or ’l’). Risk-neutral traders consider
deals at l as a bargain. Finally, denote the interval between l and h by ’m’ (or
medium). Figure 9 charts these trading measures.
In (I,P) experiments, there are hardly any bargain deals, but a high number
of expensive h trades. In (I,N) treaments, there are more bargains and less non-
value driven h deals. Experience almost completely eliminates these non-value
driven deals, and most trades are of moderate size.
Table 7 quantifies the informal comparisons of this subsection so far, and
confirms them.
Total liquidity increases significantly in policy experiments, but not with ex-
perience. Both measures of trade liquidity (absolute and relative) show higher
investment in bonds in policy experiments (statistically, the absolute increase
is clearer). The focality of the increase, i.e. the reduction of volatility with
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Figure 8: Volatility of money in bond account
Variable Null Hypothesis t-statistic p-value Wilcoxon p-value
Total liquidity H0: I,P > I,N 1.845 (0.037) 1.120 (0.131)
H0: I,P = E,P 0.285 (0.778) 0.290 (0.772)
Trade liquidity H0: I,P < I,N -2.285 (0.017) -2.053 (0.020)
H0: I,P > E,P 3.883 (<10−4) 3.215 (0.001)
Relative invest- H0: I,P > I,N 1.308 (0.101) 1.431 (0.076)
ment in bonds H0: I,P < E,P -1.541 (0.067) -1.431 (0.076)
Variance money H0: I,P < I,N -3.316 (0.001) -3.626 (<10−4)
in bonds H0: I,P < E,P -0.772 (0.221) 0.630 (0.264)
Trading volume H0: I,P = I,N -0.555 (0.580) -0538 (0.591)
H0: I,P > E,P 3.797 (<10−4) 3.418 (<10−4)
Trades at more H0: I,P > I,N 1.056 (0.146) 1.799 (0.036)
than MDV H0: I,P > E,P 5.166 (<10−4) 5.731 (<10−4)
Table 7: Testing diﬀerences in distribution
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Figure 9: Level of non theory-conform trading
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respect to the share invested across participants, is strongly significant, whereas
only experience reduces total trading volume. Finally, the number of trades
at more than MDV also significantly increases in (I,P) experiments over (I,N)
experiments (clearer based on the Wilcoxon statistic). Both parametric and
nonparametric tests agree that these trades go significantly down with experi-
ence.
Trading success9 All participants start the experiment with the same endow-
ment of 10 stock and 3,600 Gulden. If they all did equally well, each participant
would own 18 · (total liquidity15) at the end of the experiment. Figure 10 exam-
ines this question.
Clearly, this is not the case. Some people do better than expected, some
worse. More interestingly, the success dependent spread in income distinctly
diﬀers in (I,P) and (I,N) markets: the best do better in (I,P) environments, and
the worst fare worse. In other words, interest policy helps sort out good from
bad traders. Experience accentuates this result: only two traders do better
with experience, six do worse or similar to before, and the extent of over -
and underperformance increases. We checked the statistical significance of the
diﬀerences using Spearmann’s Rho10; both diﬀerences are highly significant.
3.4.3 A simple model of noise trading
The model We investigate whether we can capture some of the price dynam-
ics in a simple, heuristic learning model. To this end, we develop a model of noise
trading on a stock market. As is usual in the literature on this topic (see, e.g.,
Azariadas (1993) or Brock, Hommes (1998)), we assume that some of the traders
are informed traders and base their evaluation of stock prices on fundamental
values. Others are chartists (or momentum traders). We assume that chartists
have adaptive expectations. This assumption has a long history in economics
that goes as far back as, to our knowledge, Irving Fisher; it has also been found
to correspond well to actual price forecasts of participants of prior laboratory
stock market experiments (see Smith, Suchanek, Williams (1988)). Essentially,
adaptive expectations describe chartists as trend-following. Informed traders
expect that stock prices will, in the long run, approach fundamental values if
they currently diﬀer from them.
We now describe the model elements. A population of traders deals over 15
periods in a dividend-bearing stock on a stock exchange; t is time, indexing the
periods, i.e. t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 15}. dt is the dividend draw in period t. Dividends
are finite-valued and have a finite, discrete distribution that is stationary over
time. Let d := Et−1 [dt] ≡ E [dt], with Et−1 resp. E denoting the conditional
9We are grateful to Robert Wilson who pointed out that it was important to investigate
trading success.
10 Sperman’s Rho is what one obtains by replacing the observations by their ranks and
then computing Spearman’s product moment coeﬃcient on the ranks. As usual with non-
parametric statistics, its advantage over the Pearson coeﬃcient is that Spearman’s Rho is
distribution free.
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Figure 10: Success of participants relative to uniformly distributed income
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(unconditional) mathematical expectation, which coincide in our market struc-
ture.11 dt evolves over a trivial filtration of the form F1 = F2 = ...F15 = F , Fi
being natural (minimal) for di.
We assume risk-neutral traders who have common knowledge of the market
structure. In addition to the stock, there is a risk-free bond carrying an interest
of rt12 . Xt ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of informed traders in the population of traders.
We define two measures for the sensitivity of adjustment of informed and of noise
traders’ opinion, λit, λnt ∈ [0, 1]; the significance of these two parameters will be
clear in a moment. ft and pt are fundamental resp. actual stock prices in period
t. The fundamental value is calculated from a standard risk-neutral dividend-
discount model. Finally, pe,it , p
e,n
t and p
e
t are the price expectations for period t
of informed traders, noise traders, and the market overall in period t− 1. From
a behavorial point of view, these expectations are reference levels.
We now formalize the diﬀerent expectations that we intuitively described
above:
pe,it = pt−1 + λit (ft − pt−1) price expectation of informed traders
pe,nt = p
e,n
t−1 + λnt
¡
pt−1 − pe,nt−1
¢
price expectation of noise traders
For simplicity, we assume that the market expectation is just a weighted
average of individual expectations of the participants. This leads to
pet = Xtp
e,i
t + (1−Xt)p
e,n
t
We assume the absence of arbitrage opportunities, i.e. that
pt =
d+ pext+1
1 + rt
,
where pext+1 is some price expectation for period t + 1 in period t. It is
a matter of simple algebra to calculate the equilibrium prices in the diﬀerent
market situations. In a market with noise traders and informed traders, i.e.
under the expectation pet , the equilibrium price is given by:
p∗t =
Xt+1λit+1ft+1 + (1−Xt+1)(1− λnt+1)(1 + rt−1)p∗t−1 + (1− (1−Xt+1)(1− λnt+1))d
1 + rt − (1−Xt+1)λnt+1 −Xt+1(1− λit+1)
,
assuming that the denominator is diﬀerent from zero.
Fitting the model to the data It is not possible to fit the model uniquely to
the experimental data because there are too many degrees of freedom. Hence, we
make some simplifying assumptions. Under common knowledge of the market
11Formally, the conditional expectation is a random variable, which in our case is concen-
trated on one point, E [dt].
12Remark the change in notation for the interest rate from i to r in order to keep it separate
from the letter i that now indicates informed traders in our economy.
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structure, one could claim that the sensitivity of adjustment - the parameters
λ - depend only on the fraction of the respective traders in the population.
This amounts to saying that if 80 % of the traders are informed, the market
opinion is that there is a move to fundamental values of 0.8 · (ft − pt−1), which
is counterbalanced by a 20 % move based on the change of opinion of chartists,
i.e. of 0.2 · ¡pt−1 − pe,nt−1¢. Formally, this means
λit : = Xt
λnt : = 1−Xt
We can now fit our model to the experimental data. We are interested in
checking which assumptions on the parameters of the model have to be made
in order to produce the experimental outcome and to check whether the results
follow a pattern that is intuitively appealing. One possible conjecture has the
percentage of informed traders increase towards the end of the experiment,
either because the participants learn to understand the model better, or simply
because the for a ’rational’ solution necessary backward induction gets easier
over time. Learning and backward induction may result from conscious as well
as unconscious thinking, along the lines of Simon’s remark that one cannot
”rule out the possibility that the unconscious is a better decision-maker than
the conscious.” (Simon (1955)).
Let
−→
X := (X1,X2, ...,X15)
t be the vector of the proportion of fundamental
traders by period. The theoretically market clearing price is then of the form
p∗ := −→p (−→X ) :=
³
p1(
−→
X ), p2(
−→
X ), ..., p15(
−→
X )
´t
. Denote the observed mean con-
tract price in experiment i by Pi = ¡Pi1,Pi2, ...,Pi15¢t. Stack prices as follows:
P = ¡P1,P2, ...,Pn¢t, where n is the number of experiments by treatment, and
p = (p∗, p∗, ..., p∗| {z }
n-times
)t. Let I := ×
i=1,2,...,15
[0, 1] be the 15-dimensional unit cube.
We estimate
−→
X using non-linear least squares as13
−→
X = argmin
−→
X∈I
(p− P)t (p− P) .
Figures 11 and 12 sum up the results of our estimations.
The results of the no policy (I,N) und (E,N) sessions are roughly as con-
jectured from first principles. The proportion of trading due to ’rational’ con-
siderations increases over time, either because participants learn to understand
the model better or because backward induction is easier close to the end of
the experiment. Despite the negative spike in periods 9 and 10, we note the
13Non-linear least squares are the simplest form of estimation using the generalized
method of moments (GMM). GMM proceeds by minimizing a quadratic form like Q :=
(p− P)t Σ (p− P) (Σ some positive definite weighting matrix); in the case of non-linear least
squares Σ = Id (the identity matrix). The form of the asymptotically optimal weighting ma-
trix is well-known (see Hansen (1982) or also Andrews (1991)). Economic experiments usually
work with small-samples, and so it is doubtful whether the use of an asymptotically optimal
matrix would benefit the quality of estimation.
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Figure 11: Implied proportion of ’rational’ traders
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Figure 12: Comparison of implied proportion of ’rational’ traders
same basic pattern in (E,P) experiments. Only in (I,P) sessions this pattern
is largely absent - remark that all intervention periods are local minima of the
implied share of rational trading. Something else is curious about the (I,P)
treatments14. The graph of these sessions looks as if three learning cycles suc-
ceed each other. Each begins with minimal rationality in an intervention period
(4, 8, and 12), after which the implied share of rational traders rises somewhat
until the next intervention. Hence, (I,P) experiments look as if they consist of
three small, disjoint versions of the results of the other treatments.
3.5 Analysis of the research hypotheses
Conjecture 1: C1 predicts that B(I,P)=B(I,N)=B(E,P)=0. Our data
show that this is clearly not the case. There are bubbles based on every measure
(see figure 3), and the bubble measures do not equal zero (tables 3 and 4). We
reject the hypothesis that βP = βN = 0 on a highly significant level (table
6), and even more clearly the hypothesis that all coeﬃcients are jointly zero
(F-statistic in table 6). Hence, our data strongly refutes conjecture 1.
Conjecture 2: Based on figure 3, bubbles are much more pronounced in
inexperienced treatments; the two inexperienced treatments diﬀer less obviously
from another. Tables 3 and 4 quantify this impression. Experience reduces all
bubble measures except for turnover and duration. In addition, volatility, naive
deviation and duration (on a 15 % level) significantly diﬀer in (I,P) sessions
from (I,N) sessions. Table 6 reports the results of several tests based on the
regressions we conducted. Using this measure, we find only rarely statistically
14Muhamet Yildiz pointed this out to us.
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significant diﬀerences; namely, only the coeﬃcient of price variance significantly
diﬀers in inexperienced sessions.
When we look at all the evidence for inexperienced sessions, we find that
interest policy reduces the duration and deviation of bubbles compared to ses-
sions with no interest policy; i.e., we have some support for our hypothesis,
although it is not entirely clear. Experience, on the other hand, is found to
have an unambiguous eﬀect: almost all measures support B(E,P)<B(I,P) and
B(E,N)<B(I,N).
It is immediately apparent from figure 6 and table 7 that higher interest
rates create additional income (investing into bonds is more profitable). De-
spite of this, figure 7 shows that there is less money in people’s trade accounts!
(table 7 confirms that the diﬀerences are highly significant) We will discuss this
surprising result below in conjecture 4; for now we just note that it conforms
well with conjecture 2. It will also become clear later why the result is not so
surprising after all.
Summing up, we have some evidence for conjecture 2.
Conjecture 3: The experiment clearly documents the increase in price
volatility. All measures, from figure 3, table 3, table 4, to table 6, agree; in fact,
this is the only diﬀerence that finds statistically significant support from the
tests reported in table 6.
Figure 9 charts the trading behavior in the respective markets. We observe
more trades at more than MDV in (I,P) than in (I,N) sessions (table 7 shows that
the diﬀerence is significant, in particular based on the nonparametric Wilcoxon
test).
As we have mentioned before, trades at h are diﬃcult to reconcile with
theory conform trading. Perfectly rational risk-neutral traders with common
knowledge of the market structure backward induct, which prevents bubbles
from happening (c. conjecture 1). In order to understand these trades from
a ’rational’ modeling perspective, we have to assume either risk-aversion or a
more complex - and hence ad hoc - model structure (such as the expectation of
capital gains, or boundedly rational players that have computational limits, c.
Rubinstein (1998)).
Porter, Smith (1995) have shown that risk-aversion alone does not account
for what are errors in decision making for risk-neutral players with common
knowledge (trades at h). On the other hand, Lei, Noussair, Plott (2001) have
argued that lack of common knowledge of rationality alone does not explain
the trading behavior either. What about computational limits for the players?
Were they to account for a majority of non-theory conform trades, we would
see the following two qualitative patterns:
1. The number of trades at more than UBV per period would go down over
time.
2. The share of ’rational’ trades would go up over time.
Figure 9 shows that the first is very much not the case in our experiment -
in fact, if anything we observe the opposite. We can get a rough estimate of the
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Figure 13: Dividend excess return
level of theory-conform trading from our noise trading model. While we do find
the second pattern in (I,N) experiments (and approximately in (E,P) experi-
ments (figure 11), the implied proportion of rational traders in (I,P) treatments
is highly erratic - no systematic pattern exists. Note that all three interven-
tion periods - periods 4, 8, and 12 - are local minima of rationality. But it is
not only the pattern (or lack thereof) of the evolution of the implied share of
rational traders over time that is interesting: except for in one or two periods,
the proportion of rational traders is higher in control than in policy treatments
(figure 12). We conclude that conjecture 3 conforms well with the data.
Conjecture 4: We have remarked above that it is clear from figure 6 and
table 7 that higher interest rates create additional income (investing into bonds
is more profitable); figure 13 shows that higher interest rates also increase the
opportunity costs of holding stock. Given that the relative value of stocks per
period is lower in (I,P) experiments, participants should hold more bonds as
a share of their portfolio. On the other hand, because other factors - such as
liquidity - influence investment decisions too, and because total income is higher
in policy treatments, we do not a priori know whether to expect absolutely less
money in their trade accounts. Figure 7 shows that both are true, table 7 that
the diﬀerence is highly significant (a little stronger, surprisingly, for absolute
than for relative diﬀerences). The change is unanimous: the variance of the
share invested in bonds goes down significantly from (I,N) to (I,P) experiments
(figure 8 and table 7). Experienced subjects recognize their opportunities better
(figures 7 and 8 and table 7).
Table 8 shows the value impact on Walrasian price adjustment.
In inexperienced policy sessions, the price process recognizes an increase in
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Treatment
I,P I,N E,P E,N
Variable Rho p-value Rho p-value Rho p-value Rho p-value
Excess bids 0.451 (<10−4) 0.356 (0.001) 0.515 (0.001) 0.278 (0.336)
Volume 0.086 (0.438) -0.050 (0.655) 0.057 (0.718) -0.156 (0.597)
Total liquidity -0.221 (0.043) -0.124 (0.262) 0.099 (0.532) 0.046 (0.876)
Trade liquidity -0.289 (0.008) 0.269 (0.014) 0.135 (0.395) 0.328 (0.253)
Change of i -0.230 (0.035) n/a (n/a) -0.154 (0.331) n/a (n/a)
Div. excess return -0.314 (0.004) 0.055 (0.618) 0.530 (<10−4) -0.209 (0.474)
Table 8: Spearman’s Rho between price change and other variables
interest rates. Note that this is less the case in experienced sessions. We think
that this is because participants who faced the exact same market situation
before anticipated changes in interest rates. If they did, prices should have
reflected their expectation even before the change actually hit the market. The
same table shows how changes in the dividend/excess return15 influence market
prices. Because we held the interest rate constant in control experiments, there
is no significant impact of the dividend/excess ratio in (I,N) and (E,N) sessions.
We have anecdotal evidence of the importance of strategic investment de-
cisions that are far from what the APH would predict. The asset market is
a zero-sum game, so the optimal decision on a group level would have been
investment in bonds (money in trade accounts is - on a group level - money
lost because it does not carry interest). In other words, it would have been
’rational’ for the group to keep the stock and invest all cash in bonds, or from
the viewpoint of the individual participant to sell the stock for a ’good’ price
and invest the proceeds in bonds. We identified our best two traders. In their
(I,P) sessions, they behaved exactly in this fashion: they sold all their stock for
m and h prices early on, invested the money in bonds, and leaned back for the
rest of the experiment. As a result, over two rounds, they made about six times
as much money as the worst participant in their group.
Figure 10 charts the success dependent spread: it increases from (I,N) to
(I,P) treatments (the increase is statistically highly significant).
Summing up, we have ample evidence to support conjecture 4.
Conjecture 5: We have pointed out before how conjectures 3 and 4 put
the APH in doubt. Consider additionally the following: we held the experi-
enced sessions right after the inexperienced sessions, on the same day. If the
experimental subjects actually traded because they were bored, the market vol-
ume (turnover) would not be significantly diﬀerent in the inexperienced and the
15The dividend/excess return is defined as
d-et =
E [dt]
Pt−1
− it.
More formally, Pt−1 in the denominator should be the conditional price expectation in period
t− 1 for period t. Our formula amounts to assuming static expectations.
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experienced sessions. The same applies if they traded because they (wrongly)
assumed that we wanted them to trade. Table 6, however, shows that turnover
goes down from (I,P) to (E,P) sessions (the diﬀerence is highly significant). As
we have pointed out before, it is the profit-maximizing strategy to invest all
money in bonds. If rational traders understand this, or learn it with experience,
turnover goes down. Hence, we interpret the decline in trade volume to signal
that participants learned to recognize value better in experienced session. We
have another hint that trade is not due to the APH. If trade were due to the
APH, we were likely to see investment patterns such as
1. Constant share of the participants’ portfolio invested in bonds over time.
2. Constant amount of trade liquidity on the participants’ trade account over
time,
in particular the second. We see neither pattern in our experiments (figures
7 and 8, and table 6).
4 Conclusions
The first conclusion follows immediately from the discussion of conjecture 1 in
section 3.5.
Conclusion 1 The data of our experiments contradict the predictions of stan-
dard rationality models of economic theory.
Conjectures 3 and 4 imply another conclusion:
Conclusion 2 Interest policy is modestly beneficial for the size and duration
of bubbles. On the other hand, it strongly increases the volatility in the stock
market.
Conjecture 4 in conjunction with conjecture 3 also supports another corol-
lary:
Conclusion 3 The stock market is characterized by departures from trading at
values predicted by basic economic models. The portfolio decision more general,
however, is consistent with rational choice.
In sum, we conclude that while it is good to be the king (or Alan Greenspan),
it is not easy. When even in a modestly complex setting (such as in our experi-
ment) it is hard to calibrate an interest policy that deflates bubbles in a timely
and controlled manner - how much more so must this have been the case in the
American economy? We have some success, but find ourselves trading-oﬀ the
deflation of a bubble with an increase in market volatility, a certainly undesir-
able by-product. On the other hand, it is satisfying to see how the rationality
of people shines through their portfolio choice. For real stock markets, it stands
to hope that this self-motivation of value-driven people, together with timely
interventions of central banks, will conceivably manage to do just as well, and
hopefully better, than our experiment implies in a laboratory setting.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Figures and tables by experiment
We first show mean contract prices, trade volume and fundamental value for
generic experiments with inexperienced and experienced traders. In the inex-
perienced case, we held two sessions at the same time. Both groups faced the
same dividend payments. One was subjected to interested policy; we fixed the
interest rate at 5 percent for the other. This is why we also show the results of
these two groups in the same graph.
We next plot the bubbles for all generic experiments. For definitions of the
’naive’ and ’sophisticated’ perspective, check section 3.1.
We then present the same figures for non-generic experiments. The section
concludes with a table of the bubble measures by experiment.
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Figure 14: Mean contract prices in experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5
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Figure 15: Mean contract prices in experiments 6, 9 and 11
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Figure 16: Experiments 1 (top row) and 2 (bottom row) - Price and volume
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Figure 17: Experiments 3 (top row) and 5 (bottom row) - Price and volume
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Figure 19: Experienced experiments 4 (top left), 7 (top right), 10 (bottom left)
and 12 (bottom right) - Price and volume
43
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0
10
20
30
40
50
Period
Vo
lu
m
e
Interest policy
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
G
ul
de
n
NPV
Mean contract price
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0
10
20
30
40
50
Period
Vo
lu
m
e
Interest rate fixed at 5 percent
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
G
ul
de
n
NPV
Mean contract price
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-100
0
100
200
300
400
Period
G
ul
de
n
Experiment 1
Interest policy
Interest rate fixed at 5 percent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-100
0
100
200
300
400
Period
G
ul
de
n
Experiment 2
Interest policy
Interest rate fixed at 5 percent
Figure 20: Experiment 11 - Price and volume (top row), and sophisticated
bubbles in experiments 1 and 2 (bottom row)
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Figure 21: Sophisticated bubbles in experiments 3, 5, 6 and 9
45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
Period
G
ul
de
n
Experiment 1
Interest policy
Interest rate fixed at 5 percent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-200
0
100
200
300
400
Period
G
ul
de
n
Experiment 2
Interest policy
Interest rate fixed at 5 percent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-200
0
100
200
300
400
Period
G
ul
de
n
Experiment 3
Interest policy
Interest rate fixed at 5 percent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-200
0
100
200
300
400
Period
G
ul
de
n
Experiment 5
Interest policy
Interest rate fixed at 5 percent
Figure 22: Naive bubbles in experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5
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Figure 24: Comparison of bubble measures in generic experiments with interest
policy (I)
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Figure 25: Comparison of bubble measures in generic experiments with interest
policy (II)
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Figure 27: Mean contract prices, trade volume, and bubbles in non-generic
experiments
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Bubble measure
Treat- Dura- Turn- Ampli- Vola- Devi- Devi- Rel.
ment tion over tude tility ation(s) ation(n) bubble
I,P
3 2.11 1.20 0.14 1.52 0.94 0.9
3 3.20 1.23 0.18 2.25 1.43 0.53
2 5.38 1.01 0.39 1.76 1.07 0.51
4 2.69 0.69 0.15 1.23 0.46 0.44
7 6.63 1.29 0.29 2.98 2.12 0.67
1 2.64 0.72 0.22 1.72 0.82 0.50
I,N
2 3.58 0.99 0.14 1.64 1.12 0.50
6 2.46 0.96 0.14 1.77 1.22 0.45
7 3.01 1.39 0.08 3.46 2.91 0.64
4 4.48 1.10 0.28 1.97 1.50 0.52
14 7.23 0.91 0.05 0.80 1.20 0.40
2 3.01 1.15 0.16 2.50 1.88 0.53
E,P
1 2.40 0.47 0.10 0.77 0.16 0.34
6 2.73 0.70 0.12 1.17 0.39 0.55
2 2.53 0.77 0.12 0.46 0.89 0.25
E,N
2 2.83 0.36 0.10 0.58 0.15 0.23
Table 9: Bubbles measures by experiment
5.2 The interest rate policy algorithm
The algorithm is written in a pseudo code that resembles C. Knowledge of any
programming language should be suﬃcient to read our code.
Pseudo code for interest rate policy
(define variables)
float X [15] /* mean contract prices */
float FV [15] /* fundamental values */
float b /* bubble tolerance, b² (0, 1) */
float irange [5] /* possible interest rates */
integer pointer /* pointer to current interest rate */
float i /* current interest rate */
integer time /* keep track of last intervention */
Boolean posbub /* indicator function for positive bubble */
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Boolean negbub /* indicator function for negative bubble */
(initialize parameters)
b = 0.5
irange [1] = 0.01 /* decide on possible interest policy */
irange [2] = 0.05
irange [3] = 0.11
irange [4] = 0.15
irange [5] = 0.21
pointer = 2 /* begin with i = 0.05 */
i = irange [pointer]
time = 1 /* first intervention in period 4 (=1+3) */
posbub = False /* no bubbles yet */
negbub = False
(subroutine raise interest rates)
begin subroutine HIGHER
if pointer ≤ 4
pointer = pointer + 1
time = 0 /* intervention has happened
so no more interv. for 3 periods */
endif
end subroutine
(subroutine lower interest rates)
begin subroutine LOWER
if pointer ≥ 2
pointer = pointer − 1
time = 0 /* intervention has happened
so no more interv. for 3 periods */
endif
end subroutine
(main program)
begin MAIN
for t = 1 to 15
read X [t] /* get current values */
read FV [t]
time = time+ 1 /* time since last
intervention has passed */
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(check all bubble states and adjust)
if X [t] ≥ (1 + b)FV [t] /* check for pos. bubble */
posbub = True /* positive bubble */
negbub = False
if time ≥ 4 /* at least 4 periods since
last intervention */
subroutine HIGHER
endif
endif
if X [t] ≤ (1− b)FV [t] /* check for neg. bubble */
negbub = True /* negative bubble */
posbub = False
if time ≥ 4 /* at least 4 periods since
last intervention */
subroutine LOWER
endif
endif
if (posbub = True and X [t] ≥ (1− b)FV [t] and X [t] ≤ FV [t])
posbub = False /* was pos. bubble -> no bubble */
subroutine LOWER
endif
if (negbub = True and X [t] ≤ (1 + b)FV [t] and X [t] ≥ FV [t])
negbub = False /* was neg. bubble -> no bubble */
subroutine HIGHER
endif
i = irange [pointer] /* adjust interest rate */
next t /* end of this period */
end MAIN
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5.3 Experimental instructions
Overview16
You are now participating at an economic experiment that deals with trading
in stock markets. Contingent on your decisions in this experiment, you can earn
money in excess of your participation fee of 10 Franken17. Hence, it is important
that you read these instructions very carefully. At the end of the document you
find some questions. Please answer them and tell us when you are done.
Please refrain from talking for the duration of the experiment. If
you have questions, please ask us. If you do not observe this rule, we will have
to exclude you from this experiment and all payments, and ask you to leave.
The experiment consists of 15 periods. The currency of the experiment is
called Gulden18, not Franken. You can earn Gulden in each period. We will
exchange your Gulden to Franken at the end of the experiment, at a rate of
1000 Gulden = 120 Rappen19
Basic structure of the experiment
This experiment is about investment of money. You can buy either stocks
or bonds. You can also trade in stocks. Bonds bear interest. Money you use for
trade does not bear interest. Each period, stocks pay a dividend.
At the beginning of the experiment, i.e. at the beginning of the first period,
you receive an endowment in money and in stocks. Each period is structured
in the same way. You first decide how much money to put into bonds and how
much money to reserve for trade in stocks. You can then trade in stocks, i.e. sell
them to other participants or buy them from other participants. You can only
use the money you reserved at the beginning of the period for trade in stocks.
After the trade phase, you receive a dividend for each stock in your possession,
and interest on your bonds. You can use this money and the stocks again in the
next period. Some details:
1. The dividend: Each stock pays a dividend at the end of every period.
The dividend amount is determined by chance. It is either 0, 8, 28 or
60 Gulden for every stock in your possession at the end of the respective
period. Each amount is equally likely and determined in each period with
the aid of a dice. In other words, on ’average’ (over many periods) you
can expect to earn 24 Gulden per period per stock in your possession, if
you are lucky 60, and if you are unlucky 0.
2. The interest: You receive interest on money invested in bonds. The
interest rate is 5 % per period originally. It is variable which means that
16The instructions are translated from German.
17One dollar are about 1.8 Franken.
18A Gulden is a medieval coin.
19 100 Rappen = 1 Franken.
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it is possible, but not certain that the interest rate is going to change in
later periods. You do not receive interest for money on your trade account.
The accounts
1. Stock account: At every point in time, this account shows the current
number of stocks in your possession.
2. Cash accounts:
(a) Trade account: You can use the money on this account to buy
stocks during the trade phase (c. periods). It does not bear interest.
(b) Bond account: This account contains the money that you declared
as non-trade money for this period. It does bear interest.
(c) Total cash: The sum of the previous two accounts.
Your profit
It is very easy to calculate your profit in Gulden (in addition to the 10
Franken showup fee). It is:
Money on your total cash account at the end of period 15.
You do not receive anything for stock in your stock account at the end of
the experiment. During the experiment, you have the following options to make
a profit:
1. Buying and selling of stocks
2. Dividends on your stocks
3. Interest on cash in bonds
The periods
1. Splitting your cash on the accounts
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At the beginning of each period, you receive an overview over the current
state of your wealth (see above). This overview specifies:
(a) The average price at which stocks traded in each of the previous
periods.
(b) The state of your total cash account and your stock account.
(c) The current interest rate that will be paid in this period on money
in your bond account.
On the bottom of the page you notice the icon of a calculator. When you
click it, a calculator appears on your screen. You can use it for calculations
at this stage of each period.
You then have to make a decision before trade in stocks begins:
• Divide your cash between your trade account and your bond account.
In the following trade phase of this period, you can use only money
in your trade account to deal in stocks. You receive interest on
money in your bond account.We added a button ’calculate interest’
to help you translate percentage points into Gulden. When you hit
this button you see, under the bond account, the amount in Gulden
you would receive at the end of this period at the current interest rate
if you put as much money into the bond account as you currently do.
You can try out diﬀerent amounts in your bond account and compare
the Gulden they pay you at the end of the period before you continue.
• When you are happy with how you split your cash on the two ac-
counts, first press the ’calculate interest’ button and then the ’ok’
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button on your screen. Even if you want to pass on the calcula-
tion of interest, you have to first hit the ’calculate interest’ button
and only after that the ’ok’ button. The experiment switches to the
(stock) trade phase of this period once the last participant has hit
the ’ok’-button.
2. The (stock-) trade phase
In each period you have 2 minutes and 30 seconds to trade stocks. Check
the trade screen below. On top is the current period and time remaining.
In the middle of the screen, you see the number of stocks in your stock
account and the Gulden in your trade account.
In the lower part of the screen, you trade:
(a) You make sales oﬀers to the other participants in the window on
the very left. Enter the price you are asking for in the blue field and
press ’sell’. This price appears then on the screen of all participants
right next to this field, in the field ’sales oﬀers.’ You can only enter
integer, positive amounts, and your oﬀer must be lower than the
currently lowest oﬀer.
(b) The next window contains the sales oﬀers of all participants. You
can buy one stock at one of these prices. The currently best oﬀer
is highlighted. When you hit ’buy’, you automatically buy a stock
from the participant who made this oﬀer. The respective amount is
debited to your trade account.
(c) The window in the center of the lower part of the screen lists all
prices at which stocks were traded in this period.
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(d) The fourth window contains the price bids of all participants. You
can sell one of your stocks at one of these prices. The best bid
is highlighted. When you hit ’sell’, you sell one of your stocks to
the participant who made this oﬀer. The resulting cash amount is
credited to your trade account.
(e) You can make an oﬀer to buy in the window on the very right. Enter
the amount at which you are willing to buy a stock into the blue field
and hit ’buy’. This price subsequently appears on all screens in the
field ’oﬀers to buy.’ You can only enter integer, positive amounts,
and your oﬀer must be higher than the currently highest oﬀer.
Some trade rules for stocks:
• Do not sell stocks that you do not own yet.
• Do not sell stocks to yourself.
• Do not buy stocks with debt, i.e. you are not allowed to oﬀer more for
a stock than you currently have on your trade account (You cannot
access money in your bond account for trade in this period).
The computer will enforce these rules automatically. If ever you are as-
tonished about problems with the execution of one of your orders, please
check first whether you followed these rules.
3. Summary of this period
At the end of each period, you receive a summary of your profits from
dividends on your stock and interest on money in your bond account.
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Additionally, this summary shows the current state of your accounts. Press
the ’continue’ button once you are ready. Check the screen shot and the
short description under it.
Line 1: The money you put into your bond account at the beginning of
this period.
Line 2: Your profit in Gulden from the interest on the amount from line
1.
Line 3: Cash on your trade account at the end of this period, i.e. after
the stock trade phase.
Line 4: This period’s dividend (per stock).
Line 5: The number of stocks you own at the end of this period, i.e. after
the stock trade phase.
Line 6: The product of lines 4 and 5.
Line 7: The sum of lines 1, 2, 3 and 6.20
20The participants were then asked to answer several questions that followed the instruc-
tions. Their sole purpose was to make sure that the participants had correctly understood
the instructions.
60
References
[1] Andrews, D. 1991. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix
estimation. Journal of Econometrics 2 105-110.
[2] Azariadas, C. Intertemporal Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers
1993
[3] Brock, W.A., C.H. Hommes. 1998. Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos in a simple
asset pricing model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22 1235-1274.
[4] Caginalp, G., D. Porter, V. Smith. 1998. Initial cash/asset ratio and asset prices: An
experimental study. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 95 756-761
[5] Conover, W. Practical nonparametric statistics. 3rd. edn. New York, NY: Wiley 1999
[6] Fischbacher, Urs. 1999. Z-Tree: A toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Work-
ing paper No. 21, University of Zurich.
[7] Hansen, L. 1982. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators.
Econometrica 50 1029-1054.
[8] King, R.R., V. Smith, A. Williams, M. van Boening. 1993. The robustness of bubbles
and crashes in experimental stock markets. In I. Prigogine, R.H. Day, P. Chen (eds.),
Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[9] Krugman, P. The return of depression economics. 1st. edn. W.W. Norton & Company
May 1999.
[10] Lei, V., C. Noussair, C. Plott. 2001. Non-speculative bubbles in experimental asset
markets: lack of common knowledge of rationality vs. actual irrationality. Econometrica
69(4) 831-59.
[11] Porter, D., V. Smith. 1995. Futures contracts and dividend uncertainty in experimental
asset markets. Journal of Business 68(4) 509-541
[12] Rubinstein, A. Modeling bounded rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998.
[13] Schwartz, T., Ang, J. 1989. Speculative bubbles in the asset market: An experimental
study. Paper presented at the American Finance Association Meetings, Atlanta, Decem-
ber.
[14] Shiller, R. 1981. Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes
in dividends? The American Economic Review 71(3) 421-436
[15] Simon, H. 1955. A behavorial model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics
69 99-119
[16] Smith, V., G. Suchanek, A. Williams. 1988. Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expecta-
tions in experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica 56(5) 1119-1151
61
[17] Smith, V., M. van Boening, C. Wellford. 2000. Dividend timing and behaviour in labo-
ratory asset markets. Economic Theory 16(3) 567-583
[18] Tirole, J. 1982. On the possibility of speculation under rational expectations. Economet-
rica. 50(5) 1163-1187.
[19] Van Boening, M., Williams, A., LaMaster, S. 1993. Price bubbles and crashes in exper-
imental call markets. Economic Letters 41 179-185.
62
